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Abstract 
 This research is a critical analysis of criminal justice policy in Virginia, specifically, the 
use of the Virginia Pretrial Risk Assessment Instrument (VPRAI), a computer application 
designed to help judges make objective pretrial detention and release decisions. Although the 
VPRAI was originally intended as a tool to further criminal justice reform in Virginia, there has 
been very little independent inquiry into its use. My research gathers qualitative data through 
interviews with professional stakeholders and former defendants to address this gap in 
knowledge, and identify the benefits, consequences, and challenges associated with the VPRAI. I 
conclude that, at the present time, it is not effectively contributing to reform efforts, and I 
propose several policy modifications that could improve its use as a tool to eliminate cash bond, 
lower incarceration rates, and produce unbiased pretrial detention decisions.    
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Introduction 
 Federal and state criminal justice policies are undergoing a paradigm shift from a “tough 
on crime” approach to a “smart on crime” approach in order to reform policies that have caused 
American per capita incarceration rates to exceed those of all other nations (Sawyer & Wagner, 
2019). This strategy seeks to safely reduce the practice of incarceration, which has become a 
costly policy in both financial and social terms. Further, evidence demonstrates that the costs of 
mass incarceration outweigh the benefits. In 2015, at the start of the federal government’s Smart 
on Crime Initiative, then U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder, acknowledged that, “well-
intentioned policies designed to be ‘tough on crime’ have perpetuated a vicious cycle of 
criminality and incarceration,” and that the “rise in incarceration is not only unsustainable—it 
has not materially improved public safety, reduced crime, or strengthened communities” (Holder, 
2015, 1).  A “smart on crime” approach recognizes these consequences, and seeks to reform the 
practices that contribute to ineffective, unfair, and unnecessary detentions. This new approach 
strives to make more informed, fair, and accurate decisions using evidence-based strategies and 
technologies.  
 One major objective of a “smart on crime” approach is to reform the practice of detaining 
low-risk individuals before their trial. It is important to reform this practice because it 
significantly contributes to mass incarceration in two ways. One, it adds to the pool of 
incarcerated individuals at the front-end of the criminal justice process. Currently, over half a 
million people, nation-wide, are detained before their trial (Sawyer & Wagner, 2019). Many of 
them are low-risk, however they remain behind bars because they cannot afford to pay a cash 
bond (Sawyer & Wagner, 2019). Two, the consequences associated with pretrial detention, such 
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as job loss, can have reverberating effects, keeping criminal defendants in a cycle of criminality 
and incarceration (Dobbie, Goldin &Yang, 2016).  
 Many criminal justice experts believe that adhering to the risk principle can safely reduce 
the practice of pretrial detention. The risk principle asserts that sorting offenders into groups 
based on their likelihood to re-offend and appear for trial will help officials use resources more 
effectively, and preserve public safety. Risk sorting helps officials direct resources to those who 
need it most, and limit intervention for those who need it least (Milgram, Holsinger, 
VanNostrand & Alsdorf, 2015). The strategy most commonly used to help the criminal justice 
system adhere to the risk principle at the pretrial stage is to replace subjective pretrial decisions 
with data-driven recommendations produced though computer applications that sort defendants 
by risk level (National Conference of State Legislatures, 2015). The rationale behind this “smart 
on crime” practice is that pretrial incarceration rates can be lowered safely when only those who 
are calculated to have a high-risk of flight or re-offense are detained (Milgram, Holsinger, 
VanNostrand & Alsdorf, 2015).  
 Virginia realized the importance of pretrial reform, and began adhering to the risk 
principle in 1989, when it incorporated pretrial reform into its “smart on crime” initiative to help 
safely address jail overcrowding (Virginia Department of Criminal Justice Services, 2018b). 
Virginia codified this reform effort through the Pretrial Services Act in 1995, which established 
agencies that could help judicial officers make better informed pretrial detention decisions based 
on a defendant’s risk (Virginia Department of Criminal Justice Services, 2018b). By 2005, 
Virginia had become the first state to implement a state-wide computerized pretrial risk 
assessment instrument to sort pretrial defendants based on risk (Virginia Department of Criminal 
Justice Services, 2013).    
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 These computer applications, known as risk assessment instruments (RAIs), use an 
algorithm to predict the likelihood that an individual will fail to appear at their trial, or will re-
offend before trial. Many different RAIs are used across the nation, and while their algorithms 
differ, all pretrial RAIs generate recommendations to either detain or release a criminal 
defendant. At the pretrial stage, judges consider these recommendations when making bail or 
bond decisions. The RAI algorithm weighs social factors and a defendant’s criminal history 
against a historical dataset (Goel, Shroff, Skeem & Slobogin, 2018). The dataset is comprised of 
statistics on prior criminal defendants’ actions and pretrial outcomes (Bechtel, Holsinger, 
Lowenkamp &Warren, 2016). RAIs sort pretrial defendants into risk levels based on how a 
criminal defendant’s factors match up to those of prior criminal defendants.  
 Although RAIs are frequently used nationwide in the pretrial process, they are not always 
efficient, and they are criticized just as often as they are praised (Hannah-Moffat, 2015). 
However, the Virginia Pretrial Risk Assessment Instrument (VPRAI) appears to be exempt from 
such criticism, which is why it is the focus of this research. Literature on the VPRAI reflects that 
there is an alarming imbalance between criticism and praise. Perhaps the criticism on the VPRAI 
is scarce because there is a lack of independent inquiry. Indeed, the company who created the 
instrument has produced much of the research literature concerning the VPRAI.  
 My research provides a valuable contribution by offering an independent source of 
research on the VPRAI. I have gathered qualitative data through interviews with Virginia 
criminal justice professionals, and documented, for the first time ever, the perspectives and 
knowledge they have gained through their experience with the VPRAI. One interview actually 
evolved into a courtroom observation, which allowed me to experience the use of the VPRAI 
during bond hearings. I have also gathered qualitative data through interviews with former 
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criminal defendants who were impacted by the VPRAI process, and I have included their 
personal perspectives and experiences in my research—another first. The data from this second 
interview group helps to ensure that the research is comprehensive and inclusive. As a whole, 
this data identifies the benefits, challenges, and consequences associate with the VPRAI, and 
allows me to assess its use and effectiveness.  
 I seek to answer the question of whether the VPRAI is an effective tool for furthering 
criminal justice reform in Virginia, or whether it is a flawed instrument that is contributing to 
pre-existing criminal justice problems. This question is difficult to answer when analyzed 
through the lens of the literature currently available. I conclude that, at the present time, the 
VPRAI is not effectively contributing to reform efforts, and I propose several policy 
modifications that could improve the use of the VPRAI as a tool to lower incarceration rates, 
eliminate cash bond, and produce unbiased pretrial detention decisions.    
 
Literature Review 
Benefits of RAIs  
 Risk assessment instruments (RAIs) have been touted by some criminal justice reformers 
and policy makers as effective solutions for furthering criminal justice reform. As one proponent 
put it, “It may seem weird to rely on an impersonal algorithm to predict a person’s behavior 
given the enormous stakes. But the gravity of the outcome--in cost, crime, and wasted human 
potential--is exactly why we should use an algorithm” (Neufeld, 2017, para. 9). Support for RAIs 
comes from a wide range of criminal justice reformers including scholars, researchers, criminal 
defense organizations, political leaders, and non-profit groups. The benefits they cite include 
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increased community safety, their potential to replace the practice of cash bond, and their ability 
to lower costly incarceration rates (Glazer, Sassaman &Wool, 2017; Herring, 2018; National 
Association of State Legislatures, 2017; Neufeld, 2017).     
 Supporters of RAIs believe that their risk-based recommendations will improve the safety 
of the community by correctly identifying high-risk individuals for detention, and properly 
identifying low-risk individuals for release. The release of low-risk individuals improves public 
safety because facts show that detaining lower-risk defendants, even for a few days, increases the 
long and short-term likelihood of new criminal activity (Milgram, Holsinger, VanNostrand & 
Alsdorf, 2015). In fact, New York City officials believe that their pretrial RAI use has allowed 
them to safely decrease incarceration rates while also keeping their crime rates below the 
national average (Glazer, Sassaman &Wool, 2017).  
  Additionally, RAI supporters also believe that these actuarial tools are a promising 
replacement to the cash bond practice, which is viewed as an ineffective and unfair pretrial 
detention policy (Herring, 2018). The Vera Institute for Justice asserts that the cash bond practice 
drives disparity already present in the judicial system, and it should be eliminated by shifting to a 
risk-based decision making practice (Glazer, Sassaman & Wool, 2017). When pretrial release is 
based on one’s ability to pay, the people who are unable to pay for their freedom face “immense 
pressure to plead guilty to crimes...” which results in judicial disparities for marginalized groups 
(Legal Aid Justice Center, 2019, para. 7). Therefore, cash bond practices are believed to be 
ineffective and unfair because they detain low-risk individuals merely because they are poor. 
This unnecessarily adds to incarceration rates, and creates judicial disparities, particularly for 
marginalized groups. 
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 A final argument in support of the use of pretrial RAIs is that they can help lower costly 
incarceration rates. Research that supports this claim shows that some pretrial RAIs have helped 
to reduce pretrial incarceration rates. For example, according to the National Association of 
Public Defenders (2017), the pretrial RAI used in Washington D.C., in conjunction with reining 
in the use of cash bonds, was instrumental in achieving a 90% pretrial release rate of arrestees in 
2016 (National Association of Public Defenders, 2017). Additionally, the New York City 
Mayor’s Office of Criminal Justice states that NYC’s pretrial RAI use has allowed the city to 
achieve “the lowest incarceration rate of any big city in the nation” (Glazer, Sassaman &Wool, 
2017, para. 4). Further, New Jersey’s pretrial RAI implementation has also resulted in pretrial 
releases being granted in 90% of cases in 2013 (National Association, 2017). Such large release 
rates would indeed lower the pretrial detention burden on local jails, and in turn result in cost 
savings, which is predicted by the Pretrial Justice Institute (2018) to average $74.61 per day for 
each detainee.  
 Concerns with RAIs  
 On the other hand, some criminal justice reformers are wary of RAIs because some of the 
factors considered in the risk calculations could serve as proxies for race, gender, or 
socioeconomic status. Some RAI’s can elevate one’s risk score “on the basis of acuteness of 
disadvantage, reinforce/mask racial and gender disparities, produce false positives, and lead to 
less transparent decisions” (Hannah-Moffat, 2015, 224).  
 Concerning racial bias, critics of RAIs point out that, if the risk factors that serve as 
proxies for crime, (such as factors concerning an individual’s criminal history, criminal justice 
supervision, and pending charges), are weighed by an algorithm in equal proportion for all races, 
then they could exacerbate racial bias already present in the criminal justice system (Glazer, 
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Sassaman & Wool, 2017). This is because people of color are “disproportionately policed, and 
are more likely to be charged by prosecutors and forced into pleas that result in convictions” 
(Glazer, Sassaman & Wool, 2017, para. 5). As a result, it is thought that, using criminal history 
data to measure risk will exacerbate existing racial disparities in the criminal justice system, and 
have a continuing “ratchet effect” on this profiled population because risk calculations are 
heavily determined by criminal history, which can serve as a proxy for race (Harcourt, 2015, 
237).  Other scholars note that, while criminal history is a strong re-offense predictor for all 
races, its inclusion in a RAI presents a “conundrum,” because, even if predictive bias can be 
ruled out, there is still the question of its perceived or actual disparate impact (Skeem & 
Lowenkamp 2016, 34).   
 Additionally, RAI critics are concerned that some RAIs do not properly measure the risk 
of two other vulnerable groups--lower-income individuals and women. Their concern stems from 
the fact that some RAIs measure risk with factors that include employment status, which could 
negatively affect individuals that are in a lower socioeconomic bracket (Starr, 2015). Further, 
many RAIs do not consider mitigating risk factors at all, which are thought to be particularly 
important when calculating a woman’s risk level (McCoy & Miller, 2013). The general concern 
is that because of the way RAIs measure risk and omit mitigating factors, these two groups will 
be assigned into a higher risk level, and be detain by data that cannot accurately measure their 
true risk. Legal scholar Sonja Starr (2015) asserts that it is wrong to use socioeconomic factors, 
such as employment status, in risk calculations because individuals ought to be considered by 
their individual risk, rather than assigned risk points because they belong to a socioeconomic 
group that is generalized as having a higher flight or re-offense risk. Starr (2015) argues that 
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neither a judge, nor policymaker, would support detention based on poverty; therefore, they 
should not support RAIs that consider this factor.  
 Further, when it comes to calculating a woman’s risk, researchers found that risk 
calculations should be different because some factors were better predictors for men, while 
others were better predictors for women. For example, substance abuse factors were determined 
to only be good predictors for men, while factors of positive social support significantly 
predicted recidivism risk accurately for women (McCoy & Miller, 2013). Another group of 
researchers concluded that gender-specific risk assessments could better predict risk for women 
because gender-neutral risk calculations can overestimate a woman’s risk. They highlighted the 
example of a pretrial RAI used in Florida, COMPAS, which uses gender-neutral data to calculate 
risk, and was discovered to be incorrectly assigning women into a higher risk level (Goel, Shroff, 
Skeem & Slobogin, 2018).  
 Perhaps settling the argument on whether RAIs can produce fair outcomes for all groups 
of people is a study by Kleinberg, Mullainathan and Raghavan (2016). These researchers first 
defined three different ways in which to measure the “fairness” of a RAI. Then, they developed a 
theorem to test if it was possible for a RAI to achieve all three aspects of fairness. They proved 
that “except in highly constrained special cases, there is no method that can satisfy these three 
conditions simultaneously” (Kleinberg et al., 2016, 1-5). Kleinberg et al. (2016) determined that 
it is highly unlikely that a RAI can produce completely fair predictions because base rates differ 
among different groups of people.  
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The Need for Transparency, Independent Inquiry, and Caution  
 Proponents and opponents alike stress the need for RAI transparency, for independent 
validation of these tools, and the need to exercise caution when it comes to how much emphasis 
is placed on data. Research by legal scholar Hannah-Moffat (2015) legitimizes these concerns. 
She found that in general all RAIs are similar to Pandora’s Box. They are poorly understood by 
policymakers and the practitioners who use them. She found that even developers of RAIs 
question their accuracy.  
 When a RAI lacks transparency its outcomes will be viewed with skepticism, and its use 
will weaken confidence in the judicial system (Goel, Shroff, Skeem & Slobogin, 2018). A study 
conducted by researchers from ProPublica (2016) on the pretrial RAI, COMPAS, called attention 
to the fact that, without transparency and independent validation, researchers and the public will 
question a RAI’s rightful use in the judicial system. These researchers examined Florida’s use of 
COMPAS, and found that it was producing racially biased pretrial release recommendations. 
African Americans were twice as likely to be incorrectly assigned to a higher risk category than 
were whites, while whites were more often miscalculated to be low-risk. A statistical test 
determined that the racial difference was not attributed to differences in the defendants’ prior 
crimes or the type of crimes they were arrested for. When trying to pinpoint what was causing 
the racial disparity the researchers hit a wall. Northpointe, the for-profit software company that 
developed COMPAS, would not share the specific calculations used by the algorithm to assess 
nearly two-dozen risk factors. Northpointe claimed the algorithm was its intellectual property 
(Angwin, Larson, Mattu & Kirchner, 2016). ProPublica was never able to determine the reason 
for its racial discrepancy, and COMPAS remains a widely criticized pretrial RAI because it lacks 
transparency (Spielkamp, 2017).   
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 Literature on certain RAIs show that these instruments can be developed and validated in 
a manner that make them more transparent and trusted. For example, the Indiana risk assessment 
tool named IPAS is a university-developed and validated tool, which gives it a higher degree of 
credence than a RAI developed by a for-profit company. IPAS also published its scoring guide 
and pretrial interview procedures (Latessa, Lovins & Makarios, 2013; University of Cincinnati, 
2010).  Additionally, a RAI developed by the Laura and John Arnold Foundation, called the 
PSA, has been praised a great deal for its transparency and independent validation. The PSA is 
not only developed by a non-profit, and open about how it calculates risk, but it also requested 
that experts at Harvard Law School study its effectiveness (Access to Justice, 2018). In 
summary, non-profit development, independent validation, and procedural transparency can 
increase confidence in the use of RAIs.  
 Still, scholars caution that “law is not math,” and that policy makers and judicial officers 
often fail to question the use of, or outcomes produced by, risk assessment algorithms (Kahn, 
2018, 190). At least one data scientist has cautioned that widely-used algorithms are capable of 
producing biased outcomes, and can result in damage to whole groups of people. This requires 
stakeholders to carefully consider how much emphasis should be placed on these “weapons of 
math destruction” (O’Neil, 2016, 3).  
 Further, Starr (2015) cautions that the “debate over risk assessments has played down the 
factors that the assessments rely on, employing feel-good euphemisms like ‘evidence-based 
sentencing’” (Starr, 2015, 235). One study confirms Starr’s assertion. Researchers conducted an 
exhaustive search for research on pretrial risk assessments, and found that there is a “distinct lack 
of research that utilizes any amount of methodological rigor” (Bechtel, Holsinger, Lowenkamp 
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& Warren, 2016, 1). This study suggests that, overall, RAIs are being implemented without 
much inquiry, and accepted without critical thought.  
 Finally, the Electronic Frontier Foundation (2018) cautions us to consider how much 
weight is placed on RAIs. This technology-focused watchdog group points out that RAIs reduce 
people to the sum of their data, and ignore their humanity. This concern, combined with the 
aforementioned concerns, draws attention to several reasons why we should exercise caution 
before implementing a tool that detains people based on data.  
The VPRAI and the Pretrial Process  
 According to the Virginia Department of Criminal Justice Services (DCJS), the VPRAI is 
a computer application that was implemented in 2005, and is currently used by the majority of 
cities and counties in Virginia (Rose, 2016; Virginia Department of Criminal Justice Services, 
2018b). Virginia has 33 separate pretrial services agencies that use the VPRAI to “assess risk of 
flight and danger to the community posed by pretrial defendants” (Virginia Department of 
Criminal Justice Services, 2013, 7).  The VPRAI is an actuarial risk assessment that uses a 
mathematical model to sort pretrial defendants into risk categories by weighing facts about a 
detained pretrial defendant against data gathered in the 1990s on the actions and outcomes of 
former Virginia defendants (Rose, 2016).  
 It is important to understand where the VPRAI fits into the pretrial process, which is the 
judicial stage between an arrest and trial. During this time period, the accused can be detained in 
jail if a judicial officer determines that the accused presents a flight risk before trial, or there is 
reason to believe the accused could pose a danger to the community if released. The pretrial 
process in Virginia is as follows (see Table 1, on page 48, for visual depiction). The process 
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begins after arrest. In most cases, the arresting officer takes the defendant to a magistrate, where 
an initial bail decision is made without using the VPRAI. If the magistrate decides to detain the 
defendant, the officer will take the defendant to jail, where he will wait to have his bail 
reconsidered during a bond hearing (Department of Magistrate Services, 2018). While the 
defendant is in jail waiting for his bond hearing, a pretrial services officer will conduct an initial 
assessment of the defendant to determine whether the current charges make him eligible for a 
pretrial risk assessment. If eligible, the detained defendant will be asked a series of questions 
related to his employment, caregiver, student status, pending charges, drug use, and criminal 
history (Virginia Department of Criminal Justice Services, 2018a). Next, the pretrial officer will 
input facts about the defendant and the defendant’s answers into the VPRAI software, which will 
generate a risk score. From this risk score, a recommendation to continue with pretrial detention 
or release is calculated by a portion of the VPRAI called the Praxis. If the recommendation is to 
release, the Praxis will include the terms of release that should be imposed to mitigate the risk of 
flight and re-offense (Virginia Department of Criminal Justice Services, 2018a). Later, at the 
defendant’s bond hearing the judge will look over the VPRAI report, which contains the 
defendant’s risk score, criminal background information, the pretrial officer’s notes, and Praxis 
recommendation. Finally, the judge will consider the risk assessment recommendation in his 
decision to release the defendant (Virginia Department of Criminal Justice Services, 2018a).  
Benefits associated with the VPRAI  
 It is important to note that the Praxis recommendation to release often comes with non-
monetary conditions attached to increase the likelihood that a pretrial defendant will show up for 
his court date, and remain on good behavior. Some of the conditions Praxis may recommend are: 
court date reminders; criminal history checks while on release; face-to-face check-ins with 
14 
 
pretrial services officers; and drug testing (Virginia Department of Criminal Justice Services, 
2018a).  According to the most recent statewide data, these risk mitigating interventions may be 
the reason why pretrial defendants that have been released, and have received some level of 
pretrial supervision between 2015 and 2018, appeared for court dates approximately 95% of the 
time, remained on good behavior 94% of the time, and complied with all pretrial requirements 
about 88% of the time (Virginia Department of Criminal Justice Services, 2018b). While these 
percentages seem to imply that Praxis’ non-monetary release conditions are beneficial, a 
comparison cannot be made between those given pretrial services and those who have not 
because outcomes for those who have not are not tracked (Virginia State Crime Commission, 
2018). 
 However, the pretrial success rates do point out that the VPRAI’s most beneficial 
component could be its Praxis risk-mitigating recommendations, which impose some level of 
pretrial supervision for released defendants. For the time being, these are not only the most 
promising statistics on the outcomes produced by the VPRAI--they are also the only statistics 
available on the impact of the VPRAI on pretrial release outcomes for bailable defendants. The 
DCJS stated in their most recent report that no statistics on the VPRAI’s release rates are 
available at this time, but that these figures were being gathered, and would be forthcoming 
(Virginia Department of Criminal Justice Services, 2018b). Additionally, the Virginia Crime 
Commission is currently in the middle of a pretrial inquiry that seeks to provide more data on 
pretrial outcomes (Virginia Department of Criminal Justice Services, 2018b). Therefore, while 
the Praxis release recommendation is the only component of the VPRAI that has been 
statistically shown to be beneficial, forthcoming statistics may reveal other beneficial aspects 
such as improved release rates and lower use of cash bonds.  
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 Another possible benefit, though not yet realized, is that the VPRAI offers a method to 
move away from cash bond practices because it emphasizes that release decisions should be 
based on risk, and it never recommends the use of cash bonds. Virginia criminal justice 
professionals are supportive of this potential benefit. Virginia Attorney General Mark Herring 
has expressed the need for alternatives to cash bonds, “I want to keep dangerous people in jail 
and I want people to show up for court, and it’s clear that there are better, more effective ways to 
achieve that. It doesn’t make much sense, nor does it make our communities safer, to make a 
low-risk, non-violent person sit in jail, while more violent or dangerous people can go free 
because of their wealth” (Herring, 2018, para. 3).  Additionally, a statement from the Virginia 
Department of Criminal Justice Services also expresses the belief that an RAI could help 
eliminate cash bond. The statement declared that the VPRAI’s objective and risk-based 
recommendations could help usher in a “new norm” for pretrial policy in Virginia that would 
include a shift away from the use of cash bonds in order to reduce unnecessary pretrial detention 
(Virginia Department of Criminal Justice Services, 2013, 4).  However, the VPRAI has not 
actually been used to eliminate the use of cash bond. In fact, almost 60% of those who are 
released before trial, and receive Praxis recommended pretrial services, must also pay a cash 
bond (Virginia State Crime Commission, 2019). If Praxis recommendations were embraced as 
intended--without the addition of cash bonds--then the VPRAI would be a beneficial tool to 
eliminate the detention of indigent defendants, and ensure that high-risk defendants were not 
released merely because they had financial resources.  
Concerns with the use of the VPRAI 
 There is a concern with how well the VPRAI measures risk for minorities. A 2016 study 
by its developer, Luminosity, found that there is “a difference in the predictive ability of the 
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VPRAI risk factors for People of Color and for Whites, with the model preforming better for 
Whites” (Danner, VanNostrand & Spruance, 2016, 8). Two factors in particular were determine 
to be a poor measure of risk for people of color because it over-classified their pretrial risk. The 
first was two or more violent convictions, and the second was the duration of the individual’s 
residency. Additionally, the validation study found that the VPRAI over-classified pretrial failure 
risk for women when it assigned weight to one factor concerning duration of residency and 
another factor considering two or more violent convictions (Danner, VanNostrand & Spruance, 
2016).  
 Another thing that is concerning is that, despite these findings, the study reached a final 
conclusion that the VPRAI produced race and gender-neutral results. Luminosity reasoned that 
when all of the VPRAI’s factors were weighed, summed, and collapsed into risk categories, the 
risk classifications became race and gender-neutral (Danner, VanNostrand & Spruance, 2016). 
This conclusion is concerning because it is the only race and gender-neutral study available, but 
may be considered biased because Luminosity has a vested interest in the VPRAI’s performance. 
Criminal justice professionals that believe this study is proof the tool produces unbiased results, 
are putting their faith in a potentially skewed conclusion.   
Method 
 Despite its widespread use in the Commonwealth, very little is known about the 
effectiveness of the VPRAI. Its risk assessment data bank is inaccessible to outside researchers, 
which makes it impossible to conduct an independent validation study. Further, its utility has 
only been assessed, in whole or in part, by the for-profit company that created it, which requires 
independent researchers to approach literature on the VPRAI with a good measure of skepticism. 
Therefore, in order to undertake a scholarly analysis of the VPRAI, I collected qualitative data 
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through interviews with professional stakeholders, and former criminal defendants who have 
experienced the use of the VPRAI by one of Virginia’s pretrial services agencies, specifically the 
Rappahannock Regional Jail Pretrial Services Agency. Speaking directly with practitioners who 
use the form, as well as individuals who have had the form used in their criminal proceedings, 
provides an important opportunity to consider firsthand how well the VPRAI works in assessing 
the risk of both individual criminal defendants but also more broadly in terms of its overall use 
as a pretrial assessment tool intended to further criminal justice reform efforts.  Finally, one of 
my professional stakeholder interviews actually evolved into a court room observation, which 
allowed me to experience the VPRAI being used during bond hearings. I recorded my 
observations and they are conveyed below.  
 This Fenno-inspired (1978) research method of participant observation and elite 
interviews was approved by the University’s Institutional Review Board (IRB) under the 
expedited review process. Approved research on human subjects, a vital component of my thesis, 
required that I amend my original plan regarding who was included as research subjects. In order 
to qualify for the expedited approval process I had to omit from my research any defendants 
whose cases had not been fully adjudicated by the courts because they are considered a 
particularly vulnerable population. Additionally, for IRB approval the interviews with the former 
defendant group had to be conducted face-to-face in order to ensure the interview was conducted 
in a confidential manner, and to verify each participant’s identity as a former defendant whose 
case had been fully adjudicated. Finally, in order to gain IRB approval I had to provide 
participants in the professional stakeholder group with the option to participate confidentially. 
This confidentiality restriction also required the interviews to be offered in a face-to-face format.   
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Interviews with Professional Stakeholders 
 I conducted interviews with eight criminal justice stakeholders whose work involves, or 
is impacted by, the VPRAI. Additionally, one interview included an observation of how the 
VPRAI is used during a bond hearing. All eight professionals were selected based on their 
willingness to be interviewed, and relay their professional experiences with the VPRAI as used 
by the Rappahannock Regional Jail Pretrial Services Agency. My research focuses on 
experiences related to just one of Virginia’s pretrial services agencies because each of the 33 
pretrial agencies have nuanced differences. The composition of these eight professionals are as 
follows: one judge from Stafford County; one prosecutor from Stafford County; two pretrial 
services officials from the Rappahannock Regional Pretrial Services Agency; two defense 
attorneys who represent indigent and non-indigent defendants; one local elected official (a 
Virginia delegate), who is also a public defender; and finally, one official from the Virginia 
Department of Criminal Justice Services (DCJS). (Detailed information on these interviewees are 
included in the appendix, see page 55.)   
 Each of these professional interviewees were asked the same set of questions in order to 
compare their answers. (These interview questions are included in the appendix, see page 56-57.)  
These questions were designed to develop an understanding of how the VPRAI impacts the work 
of each professional, and to capture their concerns and opinions on its use. Questions also probed 
whether these individuals believed the factors used by the VPRAI were a good measure of risk, 
and how we might improve the VPRAI overall. After the interviews, I analyzed the answers and 
identified emerging themes. Next, I used a table to sort answers among three major themes: 
challenges; consequences; and benefits. See Table 2, on page 49-51, for a speedy review of these 
themes. 
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Bond Hearing Observation  
 One interview was unique because it evolved into a courtroom observation, which 
allowed me to experience the VPRAI being used during bond hearings. After interviewing the 
prosecutor, I was invited to sit beside him during a series of bond hearings (about six in total), 
which allowed me to experience how the prosecutor and judge use the VPRAI’s pretrial report to 
determine whether a detained pretrial defendant should be released, and if so, on what terms. As 
the bond hearings proceeded, the prosecutor showed me each defendant’s pretrial report, which 
included the risk score and Praxis recommendations. I listened as the judge and prosecutor 
reflected on the reports and wove the information contained in them into their prosecutorial 
recommendations and judicial decisions. After the bond hearings were over, I recorded my 
observations.  
Interviews with Former Criminal Defendants  
 Next, in order to gain insight into how the VPRAI and Praxis are implemented, and to 
identify any patterns that emerge with their use, I conducted confidential, in-person, interviews 
with non-incarcerated former defendants. These former defendants have been detained pretrial at 
the Rappahannock Regional Jail (RRJ) and had a pretrial risk assessment conducted by the RRJ 
Pretrial Services Agency. Because the actual risk assessment scores and pretrial 
recommendations are not available to the public, I asked this interview group questions that 
allowed me to recreate their original risk assessment scores, pretrial recommendations, and 
outcomes. (These interview questions are included in the appendix, see pages 58-61.) These 
interviews allowed me to gain insight into who gets labeled high-risk, and under what 
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circumstances someone would get labeled as low-risk. I was also able to determine if the judge 
followed the Praxis recommendation to release or detain. Further, by interviewing this group I 
was able to collect evidence on whether the use of the VPRAI has helped further criminal justice 
reform efforts in Virginia. Finally, I was able to gather data on the social and economic impact 
associated with pretrial detention for defendants, as well as the impact on their families.  
 Due to the restrictive face-to-face interview method necessary to obtain institutional 
review board approval, only six former defendants agreed to meet for an interview. Of those six, 
only five were qualified to participate after a criminal history inquiry revealed that one former 
defendant had not actually been detained before trial, and therefore the VPRAI would never have 
been used to asses this individual’s risk level. This small group of former criminal defendants are 
not a representative sample of the whole group, but the offenses with which they were charged 
are typical criminal offenses and interviews with this small group do allow for some insight into 
the outcomes produced by the VPRAI.  
 After collecting the former defendants’ responses, I was able to replicate their pretrial 
risk assessment recommendation by using portions of the VPRAI Instructional Manual that I 
obtained from the DCJS website. (See Tables 3-5, on pages 52-53, for a visualization of the risk 
calculation procedure.) It was important to replicate this data because the actual risk scores and 
Praxis recommendations are off limits to researchers, and were not provided to any of the former 
defendants I interviewed. Therefore, I had to replicate this data in order to learn what each 
former defendant’s risk level and Praxis recommendation would have been. The replicated 
Praxis recommendations, combined with the knowledge I gained during the interview on the 
actual outcome of each former defendant’s pretrial detention, allowed me to determine, for each 
former defendant, whether the judge followed the recommendation to release or detain. It is 
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worth noting that this calculation would typically be done through the VPRAI computer 
software, but this is inaccessible to outside researchers. However, despite the different method, 
the algorithm used is exactly the same; therefore, the risk calculation should be the same.  
 My calculations began just like a pretrial services officer’s, by matching each defendant’s 
answers on the interview form to the VPRAI risk factors listed on Table 3 (page 52), and tallying 
up the points. Then, I matched each defendant’s total score with the corresponding risk level 
listed on Table 4 (page 52). Finally, I correlated the risk level with the manual Praxis chart, 
shown on Table 5 (page 53). 
 After calculating each former defendant’s risk level according to the method listed in the 
manual, I combined the score and other findings on Table 6 (page 54), for easy analysis. The 
findings were grouped under the headings of: risk score; released before trial; the VPRAI and 
Praxis recommendation was followed; the defendant recalls answering the pretrial questions; 
cash bond or pretrial services was a condition of the defendant’s release; the number of days 
detained before trial; and the hardships the defendant or their family experienced as a result of 
pretrial detention.  
Findings 
Professional Stakeholders  
 There was a general agreement among professional stakeholders --the judge, prosecutor, 
defense attorneys, public defender, DCJS official, and pretrial services officers-- that the VPRAI 
is helpful to their work. (For a summary of these findings see Table 2, column two, on pages 49-
51.) Those who work with pretrial defendants mentioned that the VPRAI’s pretrial report gives 
them a convenient and condensed summary of a pretrial defendant’s history.  For example, the 
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judge cited that the pretrial report is helpful to him because it condenses a large amount of 
important information he must consider for each bond hearing. The judge also viewed the 
pretrial report as helpful because he considered it to be a recommendation from a neutral party. 
Likewise, the prosecutor mentioned that the pretrial report’s summary of a defendant’s risk 
factors and criminal history was useful for him to consider when making his bond 
recommendations to the judge. Both defense attorneys said the pretrial report was helpful to their 
work because it allowed them to learn their client’s history, and see what the judge and 
prosecutor would consider for their client’s release. The Virginia delegate and public defender 
mentioned that the VPRAI helps stakeholders make safer release decisions based on risk.  
 Even those who do not work directly with pretrial defendants said that the VPRAI was a 
helpful tool. For example, the DCJS official mentioned that the VPRAI helps him in his work 
because one of his duties is to ensure that pretrial services’ resources are used wisely, and the 
VPRAI helps to identify the high-risk defendants who need pretrial resources and the low-risk 
defendants who do not. Finally, both the pretrial officers stated that the VPRAI helps them to 
objectively calculate a defendant’s risk in order to make an evidence-based release 
recommendation that is free of subjectivity and personal bias.    
 Additionally, as shown on Table 2 (pages 49 - 51), column six, all professional 
stakeholders said they support the use of the VPRAI. This is likely attributed to a belief that the 
benefits associated with the VPRAI outweigh its risks. There is a significant difference between 
the multitude of benefits listed in column two, and the lack of concern that the tool could result 
in the biased outcomes listed in column seven. Further, column four highlights what each 
member of this group identified as consequences related to the VPRAI, and many of these 
consequences are positive. For example, the judge mentioned that the VPRAI has made pretrial 
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services better at assessing defendants. And, one pretrial officer believed a consequence of the 
VPRAI was that it helped low-risk defendants avoid detention, and thus lowered their risk for 
recidivism and the likelihood that they would plead guilty out of desperation. The professional 
stakeholders that I interviewed all support the use of the VPRAI, and this is most likely because 
they identify many ways in which it is beneficial to defendants and criminal justice 
professionals; they identify only a few concerns over how its use could result in bias outcomes or 
negative consequences.   
 Several stakeholders also noted that the VPRAI risk scores and Praxis recommendations 
do not actually dictate pretrial outcomes. These stakeholders pointed out that pretrial officers can 
override Praxis recommendations, and that judges make the final release decisions. (These 
findings are contained in columns two and three of Table 2, pages 49-51.) For example, the 
public defender mentioned that in her experience pretrial officers do not consistently follow the 
Praxis recommendations because they are permitted to use their discretion, and can override the 
computer’s recommendation as they see fit. Both pretrial officers corroborated her claim, and 
explained that they may occasionally change the release recommendation when Praxis is unable 
to consider mitigating and aggravating factors, such as forthcoming charges or forthcoming 
employment.  
 Additionally, defense attorney #1 mentioned that in her experience judges often override 
Praxis release recommendations as judicial discretion permits them to do so. The judge also 
acknowledged that the VPRAI’s pretrial report was a helpful component in his release decisions 
because it was a neutral source of information, but he never stated that the Praxis 
recommendation controlled his decision. He reasoned that a judge must be mindful of unwise 
release recommendations. The prosecutor conveyed that he supports the use of the VPRAI as a 
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component of the release decision but that ultimately it must aid bond decisions, not control 
them. The prosecutor also mentioned that, while the computerized release recommendation can 
be helpful, human discretion is still needed. These findings are important because they 
demonstrate that the VPRAI is used to help guide pretrial release recommendations and 
decisions, and that despite their use, professional stakeholders still exercise their professional 
discretion.  
  Some stakeholders I interviewed reflected on how cooperation and communication 
among professional stakeholders is important because it helps establish confidence in the use of 
the VPRAI. For example, as shown in columns three and four of Table 2, both the judge and 
prosecutor mentioned that it was important to have a good working relationship with pretrial 
services officers in order to establish confidence in their pretrial release recommendations. The 
prosecutor stated that in his experience the quality and resources of each pretrial agency is 
different, and that getting to know the pretrial officers who conduct the VPRAI assessments and 
issue the release recommendations helps build his confidence in their ability to produce a sound 
recommendation.  
 Additionally, pretrial officer #2 mentioned that cooperation with professional 
stakeholders whose work does not entail the direct application of the VPRAI is also important to 
instill overall confidence in its use. He cited that there is a lack of cooperation between 
stakeholders whose daily work involves the VPRAI and professional stakeholders with the 
Virginia Crime Commission whose job includes studying criminal justice policies like the 
VPRAI. This lack of communication results in the Commission having a poor understanding of 
the VPRAI, which in turn limits their ability to establish confidence in its use. In summary, 
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findings show that good cooperation among professional stakeholders is necessary to build 
confidence in the use of the VPRAI.  
 Another finding is that the VPRAI helps to manage criminal justice resources. 
Interviewees mentioned this was beneficial to both professional stakeholders and to defendants. 
For professionals, the VPRAI separates high-risk defendants from low-risk defendants, and the 
Praxis recommends which pretrial services are necessary to mitigate a defendant’s flight risk or 
likelihood he re-offends. The DCJS official noted that this allows pretrial services—such as 
check-ins, trial reminders, electronic monitoring, and drug testing--to be precisely targeted to the 
high-risk individuals who need them the most, and be omitted for the low-risk defendants, which 
saves resources. Additionally, the public defender mentioned that carefully prescribed Praxis 
release conditions are beneficial to defendants because just the right amount of pretrial 
supervision helps released defendants return to court and remain on good behavior. The DCJS 
official likewise mentioned research shows that giving just the right amount of pretrial restriction 
is important because too much can hinder a pretrial defendant’s success. It seems that the 
VPRAI’s ability to sort defendant’s by risk level allows for resources to be used in the most 
effective and beneficial manner.  
 Interview responses also revealed several challenges associated with the VPRAI’s use. 
One challenge is that there is a lack of knowledge on how the VPRAI works—or even how well 
it works. For example, defense attorney #2 pointed out that many attorneys lack a full 
understanding of how the VPRAI calculates and reports risk. While he finds pretrial reports to be 
a helpful summary of his client’s history, he is confused by the numerical risk levels listed on the 
reports, and does not understand how the risk levels are assigned, or what they mean for his 
client. The DCJS official also mentioned that professional education should be offered to all 
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professional stakeholders. Pretrial officer #1 offered a different take on who needs more 
education on the VPRAI--he mentioned that there should be a greater effort to make constituents 
aware of its use. Finally, as shown on column five of Table 2, half of the interviewees in this 
group expressed the need for more inquiry into the use of the VPRAI, so that its use can be 
improved and better understood. These findings highlight the need for professional VPRAI 
training, and for more literature to be published on its use and effectiveness.  
 A second challenge associated with the use of the VPRAI was identified when two 
interviewees expressed frustration that pretrial detentions often begin at the magistrate level, 
where the VPRAI is not used. Defense attorney #1 mentioned that it is often the magistrate who 
makes the initial pretrial detention decisions, and these initial decisions are made before the 
VPRAI assessment begins. Additionally, the public defender added that these initial detention 
decisions often come with excessive cash bonds that are difficult for defendants and attorneys to 
overcome. These findings suggest that the VPRAI may be more useful if the magistrates used it 
early on in the pretrial process.  
 The professional stakeholders interviewed also suggested three ways to improve the 
factors used to calculate risk. They believed the VPRAI risk factors should be modified to: 
include mitigating factors; differentiate between the severities of crimes; and more accurately 
weigh the dangers posed by those arrested for DUIs, drug offenses, and domestic abuse. (These 
findings are contained in column five of Table 2, pages 49-51).  
Including mitigating factors into the algorithm would help produce a more accurate 
measure of an individual’s risk. For example, defense attorney #1 suggested that substance abuse 
treatment history should be included as a mitigating factor because it would likely mitigate any 
drug abuse history that the VPRAI currently considers an elevated risk factor. The public 
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defender also mentioned that the VPRAI should consider mitigating factors such as a defendant’s 
community ties, which lowers flight risk, in order to produce a more accurate measure of risk.  
 The prosecutor, both attorneys, and the public defender all mentioned in their interviews 
that the VPRAI should differentiate between the severities of crimes in order to make a more 
precise determination of a defendant’s risk to the community. For example, defense attorney #2 
suggested that the VPRAI should weigh different types of violent crimes differently, and risk 
should be assigned according to their severity. Similarly, the DCJS official suggested that 
domestic violence should be considered uniquely when factoring in the risk a defendant poses to 
the community. Defense attorney #1 further suggested that a defendant accused of a property 
crime should be considered less of a risk to public safety than if he were convicted of a violent 
crime.  
 Additionally, the VPRAI should more accurately weigh the dangers posed by those 
arrested for DUIs and drug offenses. For example, the judge and defense attorney #2 were both 
concerned that, when it comes to “hard” drug charges, the VPRAI does not take into account the 
risk an individual poses to themselves; instead, it often recommends release without adequate 
pretrial services. Similarly, when it comes to DUI charges, the prosecutor was concerned that the 
VPRAI does not adequately consider the danger an individual poses to themselves or the 
community, and it often recommends release without adequate pretrial services. Pretrial officer 
#2 highlighted that this problem is attributed to the VPRAI being poorly designed to weigh drug 
use differently, depending on the type of drug and the risk associated with its use.  
 The interviewees suggested that the aforementioned modifications be made to the VPRAI 
because they believe that these changes would help the VPRAI measure a defendant’s risk more 
accurately. These findings demonstrate that professional stakeholders have many suggestions on 
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how to improve the VPRAI. The significance of this is that, while professional stakeholders are 
not data scientists or software developers, they do have good ideas regarding how to improve the 
factors that are considered in the algorithm.  
 One final significant finding is that only one interviewee from this group expressed 
specific concerns that the VPRAI could produce biased outcomes. The public defender 
mentioned that she was concerned that there could be an increase in the likelihood of pretrial 
detention for minorities due to over-policing in minority communities. This is a concern because 
the VPRAI increases a defendant’s level of risk based on their criminal history, which could be 
more substantial for someone living in a community that is policed more frequently. The fact that 
only one interviewee was concerned by this highlights the need for independent literature on the 
VPRAI that points out why professional stakeholders should be mindful to the possibility that 
even data-driven risk assessments can produce biased outcomes.  
Bond Hearing Observations  
 As I sat beside the prosecutor during the bond hearings, I made some observations about 
the pretrial report, which is a document produced by the VPRAI, and is used during a bond 
hearing. First, a pretrial report is made up of a few sheets of paper. The first sheet includes: 
identifying information on a defendant; a convenient summary of a defendant’s charges; his risk 
factors; a detention recommendation based on his risk level; recommended conditions for his 
release; and noteworthy mitigating or aggravating factors that the VPRAI wasn’t designed to 
consider. The other pages contain a summary of the defendant’s criminal history. Another thing I 
noticed about the pretrial report is that the defendant’s race is reported in the upper right-hand 
corner. A final observation about the report is that under the release or detention 
recommendation is a sentence that conveys whether the recommendation is consistent with the 
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Praxis recommendation, or whether the pretrial officer overrode the Praxis recommendation. 
These findings suggest that, while the VPRAI’s pretrial report provides a convenient and 
objective summary of a defendant’s risk factors and criminal history, it also may introduce 
subjectivity into the release decision in two ways. First, it allows a pretrial officer to override the 
objective Praxis recommendation; second, it subconsciously suggests that a defendant’s race 
might warrant inclusion into a release decision by prominently noting a defendant’s race on the 
form.  
 I also noticed the way in which the pretrial report was used and by whom. The judge and 
prosecutor both had copies of each defendant’s pretrial report, and discussed the information it 
contained with each other. There was a pretrial services officer present at the bond hearings to 
answer questions about the pretrial reports, but he was never asked any questions. Additionally, 
all defendants appeared at the bond hearing through video conferencing because they were 
currently detained in jail. None of them had a copy of their pretrial report. Interestingly, no 
defense attorneys were present at the bond hearings. This suggests that the pretrial report is more 
beneficial to the judge and prosecutor, and not readily available to incarcerated defendants. It 
also suggests that the pretrial report is not often reviewed or objected to by legal counsel or 
pretrial defendants.  
 I also observed the way the prosecutor used the report to present his bond 
recommendation to the judge. In some cases, the prosecutor verbalized his disagreement with the 
pretrial report’s recommendation. In one case, the prosecutor pointed out that the magistrate 
should never have detained the person in the first place. In another case, the prosecutor pointed 
out that the defendant had been charged while he was detained for a different offense, and so he 
would remain incarcerated regardless of a decision to release. Yet in another case, the prosecutor 
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made note that the person was a registered sex offender, and argued that factor should be 
considered in the release decision. These observations suggest that the prosecutor does not 
always have confidence in the Praxis recommendations.  
 Finally, I observed the way the judge used the report to make his release decision. It 
appeared as though the judge had a process for making his pretrial decisions. Although the judge 
often followed the pretrial report’s recommendation, he did so after three noticeable steps. First, 
he considered the pretrial report recommendation. Then, he listened to the prosecutor’s 
recommendation. After processing both sources of information, he weighed in with his own 
judicial wisdom. This sequence suggests that the judge uses the pretrial report to augment his 
release decision, rather than control it.  
Results from Interviews with Former Defendants 
 Interviews with former defendants revealed important pretrial detention findings. As 
shown in column eight on Table 6 (page 54), all former defendants in this interview group spent 
at least one day in jail, even though all but one of them were eventually granted pretrial release 
by a judge at their bond hearing, and a Praxis recommendation determined that detention was not 
necessary. This finding shows that the VPRAI is not being used early enough in the pretrial 
process; and as a result, defendants are being unnecessarily detained pretrial. If the VPRAI had 
been used by the magistrate for the initial detention decision, then the he would have received 
the Praxis recommendation showing that detention was not necessary, and these defendants 
would likely not have been detained at all.  
 Additionally, these interviews revealed important findings concerning the use of cash 
bond. As shown in column six of Table 6, those who were granted release all reported that a cash 
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bond was required. This is important because it shows cash bond is being frequently imposed, 
and that it is imposed on both low and high-risk defendants. In fact, column two on Table 6 
shows that three of the defendants received a risk score of zero--the lowest possible score--yet, in 
order to be released, they had to post a cash bond. The use of cash bonds for low-risk defendants 
is particularly concerning because it can result in the unnecessary detention of a low-risk 
individual based on his meager financial resources.  
 Interviews with former defendants also revealed that even short-term pretrial detentions 
can create hardships. As shown in column eight of Table 2, all interviewees were detained 
pretrial for a short amount of time--between one and three days. However, as shown in column 
ten of Table 6, all interviewees mentioned that they, or their families, faced some sort of 
hardship as a result to their pretrial detention. Financial struggles and termination of employment 
were the most commonly identified hardships. Other hardships included losing their house and 
the inability to care for a child. These findings stress the need to consider how, even one day of 
pretrial incarceration, can negatively impact a defendant’s employment status, finances, housing, 
and family.  
 Risk score calculations revealed something interesting about this interview 
group—their risk scores did not always make sense, and in one case, the score did not correlate 
with legal requirements. For example, as shown on Table 6, two individuals were arrested for 
misdemeanors--one for a violent misdemeanor, the other for a non-violent misdemeanor--yet 
both individuals received the lowest risk score possible--a zero. If common sense were used, the 
court would more likely have determined that releasing someone arrested for a violent offense 
might pose more risk to the community than a person who was arrested for a non-violent offense. 
This finding suggests that judicial discretion is needed to catch such discrepancies.  
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Additionally, the Praxis recommendation can diverge from what is required by law. As 
shown in columns three and four on Table 6, the Praxis recommended release for an individual 
who was arrested for a DUI with a BAC greater than .15%, but the law requires mandatory 
detention. The discrepancy in this case could be attributed to the fact that the VPRAI manual 
directs pretrial officers to omit alcohol abuse when calculating the drug abuse category (Virginia 
Department of Criminal Justice Services, 2018). This finding also suggests that judicial 
discretion is needed to catch such discrepancies.  
 In this small sample, it was evident that the judge often followed the Praxis 
recommendations, but he also exercised judicial discretion when necessary. As shown in column 
three and four on Table 6, the judge followed the Praxis recommendation to release in all but one 
case--the DUI case, where the Praxis recommended release, but the law required detention. 
However, the judge did catch this discrepancy.  
 A final finding sheds more light on the early stages of the pretrial risk assessment process 
when the pretrial officer questions the detained defendant. This exemplifies the vulnerable 
position a defendant is placed in during the questioning process. Recall that during the 
interviews, the interviewees were asked the same questions a pretrial services officer would have 
asked them while they were detained. When the interviewees were asked, at the conclusion of 
the interview, whether they remembered answering similar pretrial risk assessment questions, 
only one interviewee remembered doing so, despite the fact they were all almost certainly asked 
them the first day of detention. She also mentioned that she was not aware of the purpose of the 
questioning, and assumed that the questions she answered while she was detained were meant to 
determine her eligibility for a bail bondsman. This is significant because it demonstrates that the 
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pretrial risk assessment is not being conducted in a manner that is transparent to the detained 
defendant, which increases the defendant’s risk of self-incrimination. Interestingly, in the other 
interview group, defense attorney #2 explained that this situation commonly occurs because 
defendants do not have an attorney present when they are asked these questions and they are 
either ignorant of how their answers might be used against them, or they are too preoccupied 
with complying with authority, so they simply offer answers without considering the 
consequences. 
Discussion 
 Measuring the VPRAI in three distinct ways is the only way to determine its 
effectiveness. The first way is to consider how professional stakeholders who use the VPRAI 
view its utility. The second way is to consider how its use is furthering Virginia’s criminal 
justice reform goals. The third way is to consider if it has any major flaws that would make it an 
ineffective tool to measure risk.  
Effectiveness of its Utility 
 First, data from the professional stakeholder group provides evidence that the VPRAI is 
an effective tool for criminal justice professionals because of its utility. All of the professionals I 
interviewed considered the VPRAI to be a useful tool for their own purposes and as a means for 
communicating with other professional stakeholders. For example, the judge related that the 
VPRAI pretrial report was an important and helpful component in his release decisions because 
it summarizes everything he needs to consider at a bond hearing, which allows for a speedy but 
thorough review. Similarly, the prosecutor stated that the VPRAI pretrial report helps him make 
bond recommendations to the judge. Additionally, the Virginia Department of Criminal Justice 
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Services official, whose job entails the oversight of the pretrial services budget, mentioned that 
Praxis recommendations help conserve resources by targeting expenditures to the individuals 
who need them most, and it even details the manner in which the resources should be used—
drug testing, trial reminders, check-ins--in order to maximize pretrial success rates. Further, both 
defense attorneys mentioned that the VPRAI pretrial report provides them with a helpful 
summary of their client’s history. Finally, both pretrial officers stated that the VPRAI helps them 
calculate objective pretrial release and detention decisions. Based on testimony evidence from 
the professionals whose work involves the VPRAI, it is indeed an effective pretrial tool when 
measured by the utility it provides to criminal justice professionals. However, this does not 
establish that the VPRAI is a comprehensively effective tool. 
Effectiveness to Further Reform Goals  
 Virginia’s criminal justice reform efforts include lowering pretrial detention rates and 
eliminating the use of cash bonds. It is believed that the VPRAI will help further these two goals 
(Herring, 2018; Virginia Department of Criminal Justice Services, 2013), but does the evidence 
support it? In order to determine if the VPRAI is an effective tool for lowering pretrial detention 
rates and eliminating the use of cash bonds, we can consider the testimony evidence from the 
former defendant group, analyze statistics on pretrial detention in Virginia from the Vera 
Institute for Justice, and note findings on Virginia’s use of cash bond from the Virginia Crime 
Commission.  
 Data from the former defendant group shows that the VPRAI is not being used early 
enough in the pretrial process to lower pretrial detentions. All interviewees in this group stated 
that they had been detained pretrial for at least a day, one for three days. However, at their bond 
hearings, all but one of them were determined by the VPRAI, and the judge, to be of low risk and 
35 
 
they were released. Had the risk assessment been conducted at the magistrate level, these 
defendants would have been identified as low-risk from the start, and likely never detained 
before their trial. Therefore, in order to truly stop unnecessary pretrial detentions, the VPRAI 
must be used earlier on in the process, during the magistrate’s initial detention decision.  
 To be fair, this group of former defendants does not represent the whole; however, data 
from the Vera Institute for Justice (2019) shows that pretrial detention in Virginia has not been 
lowered by the use of the VPRAI. In fact, since its implementation, the number of detained 
pretrial defendants has increased. When the VPRAI was implemented in 2005, there were almost 
12,000 individuals detained pretrial in Virginia. The most recent figures available show that, by 
2015, there were over 13,000 individuals detained in Virginia before their trial (Vera 2019). I 
assert that the reason for this increase, and the reason for the former defendant group’s initial 
detentions, was not due to the use of the VPRAI, but rather due to the fact that the VPRAI is not 
being used at the magistrate level. In order for the VPRAI to be used as an effective tool to lower 
pretrial detention rates, it must be used at the time the initial pretrial detention decision is made. 
 Data from the former defendants’ group also provides evidence that the VPRAI is not 
being used to further efforts to eliminate the use of cash bonds. Recall that the VPRAI never 
recommends cash bond as a condition for release, yet all of the former defendants who were 
granted pretrial release had to pay a cash bond. Although this group is not a representative 
sample of the whole, the trend is confirmed by a study from the Virginia Crime Commission 
(2018), which found that in 2017, 62% of Virginia’s pretrial detainees who were granted release 
with some level of pretrial supervision were also ordered to post a cash bond. This finding makes 
it clear that, although the VPRAI never recommends the use of cash bonds, they are still 
frequently used in conjunction with the non-monetary release conditions recommended by 
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Praxis. Using the VPRAI in conjunction with cash bonds will not lower incarceration rates, 
instead it will keep lower-income defendants unnecessarily detained. If the VPRAI is to be used 
to help eliminate cash bond practices, then judicial officials must heed the VPRAI’s release 
recommendations--and stop imposing monetary release conditions.  
 Based on the testimony evidence from former pretrial defendants and statistics from Vera 
and the Virginia Crime Commission, the VPRAI is not being used as an effective tool for 
helping further criminal justice reform goals. It has the potential to help lower incarcerations 
rates and eliminate bail reform, but to contribute to these efforts it must be used earlier on by the 
magistrate, and not in conjunction with cash bonds.  
 Effectiveness to Measure Risk 
 The final measure of effectiveness requires that the VPRAI be examined to uncover any 
flaws that would make it an ineffective tool to measure risk. In order to determine this precisely, 
a validation study would have to be conducted, which cannot be done until the VPRAI is opened 
up for independent inquiry. However, we can analyze the qualitative data gathered in this study 
and existing literature to identify potential problems with how the VPRAI measures risk. 
 Findings from this research cannot adequately establish whether the VPRAI is an 
effective tool to measure risk. However, this research does offer anecdotal evidence that 
illustrates, in some cases, the VPRAI has not produced risk scores that align with common sense 
or legal requirements. For example, consider the two misdemeanor cases that were compared 
previously, these serve as examples on how the VPRAI can assign risk scores that do not align 
with common sense. Recall that the violent offender was given the same risk score as the non-
violent offender. Additionally, the DUI case mentioned previously serves as an example of how 
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the VPRAI can fail to measure risk according to legal requirements. Recall that the risk score 
aligned with a recommendation to release, which was contrary to legal requirements.  
 This research also offers anecdotal evidence that in some cases the VPRAI does not 
adequately measure risk for drug and alcohol offenses. For example, interviews with professional 
stakeholders revealed that they are concerned with how poorly the VPRAI considers risk for 
drug charges and DUIs. Both the judge and a defense attorney expressed frustration that in drug 
cases the VPRAI does not consider the risk individuals pose to themselves. Additionally, the 
prosecutor expressed frustration that in DUI cases the VPRAI does not consider the risk 
individuals pose to themselves, nor does it adequately calculate the danger they pose to society. 
Together, these findings gleaned from interviews with professional stakeholders, suggest that in 
many ways the VPRAI falls short of perfectly measuring risk.  
  An analysis of the existing literature on RAIs can also help identify potential problems 
with how the VPRAI measures risk. Literature mentioned previously on RAIs establishes that 
some factors are a poor measure of risk for certain groups. With this in mind, a careful review of 
Luminosity’s race and gender-neutral study on the VPRAI reveals that two factors in particular 
were not a good measure of risk for people of color or women. “Two or more violent 
convictions” and “length of residency” were poor measures of risk because they tended to 
produce risk scores that were too high for members of these groups (Danner, VanNostrand & 
Spruance, 2016). While the “length of residency” factor was eventually dropped from the 
VPRAI algorithm the “two or more violent convictions” factor remains. This suggests that the 
VPRAI may not be adequately calculating risk for people of color or women because it still 
considers this faulty risk factor. If true, this flaw would make in an ineffective tool to measure 
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risk. However, no concrete conclusions on the VPRAI’s effectiveness at measuring risk can be 
made until the VPRAI is opened for independent inquiry and validation.  
 
Conclusion and Policy Recommendations 
 The VPRAI could be an effective tool to further criminal justice reform efforts in 
Virginia if it were used earlier on in the pretrial process, not used in conjunction with cash bond, 
and open to independent inquiry. An effort to modify the VPRAI would be worthwhile because it 
seems to be an effective tool for criminal justice professionals and if perfected it would help 
them accurately sort low-risk defendants for release and high-risk defendants for pretrial 
detention. Professional stakeholders viewed the VPRAI as very useful, and cited clear examples 
of how it helps them in their work. It simplifies decision making, helps direct resources, and 
provides valuable information in a summarized format. However, the VPRAI falls short of being 
effective in two important ways. First, at the present time, the VPRAI is not effectively 
contributing to reform efforts because it is not being used early enough in the pretrial process to 
avoid detentions, and it is being used in conjunction with cash bonds. Additionally, it is 
impossible to prove that the VPRAI is an effective tool to measure risk because it is not open to 
independent inquiry. Although the VPRAI falls short of being an all-around effective tool, I 
conclude that with some modifications the VPRAI could help further criminal justice reform 
efforts and produce unbiased risk assessments. Below I propose several policy modifications that 
could improve the use of the VPRAI as a tool to lower incarceration rates, eliminate cash bond, 
and produce unbiased pretrial detention decisions.    
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Policy Recommendations 
 The first policy recommendation is for the VPRAI to be used at the magistrate level. The 
VPRAI can help magistrates more accurately identify who needs to be detained. This change 
could help eliminate unnecessary pretrial detentions and in turn lower incarceration rates. Other 
criminal justice professionals already appreciate the VPRAI’s utility and likely magistrates 
would readily adopt it too.  
 Additionally, this policy modification has a small price tag that would be offset by 
pretrial detention reduction. While there would be a cost associated with training magistrates on 
the VPRAI and additional pretrial officers would be needed to conduct round-the-clock 
investigations, there should not be any additional costs associated with the change. In fact, 
overall this modification would result in cost savings because using the VPRAI at the magistrate 
level would help to lower unnecessary pretrial incarcerations from the beginning of the pretrial 
process.  
 The second policy recommendation is to eliminate the practice of cash bonds through 
state legislation. So far, the VPRAI has not been used to further this reform goal, therefore the 
practice must be ended through legislation. This would force judicial officials to solely rely on 
the Praxis recommendation for pretrial services. These services are beneficial to pretrial 
defendants because they increase the likelihood that they will show up for trial and remain on 
good behavior. The practice of cash bond offers no such support.   
 Further, this policy recommendation has more challenges than the first. For example, the 
bail bond industry will fight against the change. Legislators will have to overcome the industry’s 
influence. Moreover, the financial consequences associated with cash bond elimination should be 
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studied. However, it is beyond the scope of this research to calculate how the elimination of cash 
bond might impact the finances of the Commonwealth, or to formulate a plan to pass legislation.  
 Finally, independent studies must be conducted on the VPRAI in order to ensure that it is 
producing unbiased risk calculations and accurate release recommendations. We cannot rely on a 
for-profit company to find flaws with its own algorithm. Independent researchers would not shy 
away from finding and disclosing shortcomings, and this would improve the VPRAI by 
highlighting areas in need of correction and providing some much needed pressure on 
Luminosity to make changes. More importantly, independent inquiry is needed because 
professional stakeholders and the public must have a reliable account of the outcomes produced 
by the VPRAI. Until there is an independent validation study, we cannot be certain that accurate 
data is being used to detain individuals. 
 Together these three policy recommendations could improve the pretrial process and 
promote pretrial justice. If the VPRAI were improved through independent research and used at 
the magistrate level--without cash bond--it would be an all-around effective tool to further 
Virginia’s pretrial reform efforts. These policy modifications would help criminal justice 
professional accurately identify defendants for detention based on risk and lower costly 
detentions. Further, these improvements would ensure that pretrial justice in Virginia is equal for 
all and not exacerbating preexisting criminal justice biases through the use of inaccurate 
algorithms or flawed data.  
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Pretrial Process in Virginia 
Table 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
49 
 
Professional Stakeholders’ Answers Organized by Theme 
 
Table 2 
Professional 
Stakeholder 
Identified by 
Role 
Benefits Challenges Consequences Suggested 
Improvements  
Generally 
Supports 
Use of 
VPRAI 
and 
Praxis  
Concerns on 
bias outcomes  
DCJS Official It is evidenced- based and 
validated 
 
Provides an objective 
measure of risk, roots out 
subjective bias  
 
Risk assessment 
instruments can further 
the goal of cash bond 
elimination 
 
Praxis can save resources 
by identifying those who 
do not need pretrial 
services or detention  
 
Praxis can mitigate FTA risk  
Too much restriction 
can be harmful, we 
must be making 
correct decisions 
 
33 pretrial services 
agencies to monitor  
Need to keep 
monitoring and 
studying 
outcomes  
Factoring conviction 
is better than 
factoring in arrest 
 
Make process faster  
 
Consider the PSA 
RAI when 
contemplating 
improvements  
 
Keep studying and 
improving 
 
Consider replacing 
recommendation to 
detain with the 
word “caution”   
 
Consider domestic 
violence and mental 
health  
 
Be more precise on 
what we mean by 
“public safety”  
 
Provide 
professional 
education  
Yes  Should be 
mindful  
Judge  Very important and helpful 
component in release 
decisions 
 
Condenses lots of 
important information for 
quick review  
 
Neutral party doing 
assessment  
 
Hard to quantify 
human behavior  
 
Judges must be 
mindful of unwise 
release 
recommendations  
Pretrial services 
has become 
good at assessing 
people and 
highlighting 
discrepancies  
 
Allows for good 
collaboration 
between judge 
For drug abuse we 
must consider the 
risk of release to 
the person.  
Yes  No  
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Praxis helps keep released 
defendants out of trouble  
 
and pretrial 
services  
 
Prosecutor Helpful for bond 
recommendation 
  
Good measure of FTA  
Must aid bond 
decision, not control 
 
Human discretion  is 
still needed  
 
Must have good 
pretrial agency, they 
are not all the same  
 
Not good measure of 
someone committing 
another crime  
 
Tool sometimes 
recommends 
improper release  
Include factors for 
DWI, nature of 
offense,  
Yes No  
Defense Attorney 
1 
Good informational tool 
for all parties at bond 
hearing  
Magistrates don’t 
use the risk 
assessment tool. 
They consider 
recommendations 
from arresting 
officers.  
Geared more for 
prosecutor’s 
benefit than 
defendants 
 
Doesn’t consider 
mitigating factors  
Consider time in 
community  
 
Distinguish between 
property and 
violent crime 
 
Include substance 
abuse treatment 
history 
Yes  No  
Defense Attorney 
2 
Provides helpful summary 
of defendant’s history  
 
It’s a confidential 
document  
Uncertainty 
concerning how 
recommendations 
are calculated 
 
Judge often 
overrides release 
recommendations  
 
Increases 
defendant’s risk 
of self-
incrimination  
Training needs to 
be offered to 
attorneys 
 
The more its 
studied, the more 
we can learn how to 
improve it  
 
Differentiate 
between types of 
criminal convictions 
& charges 
 
Differentiate 
between types of 
violent crimes 
 
 Consider risk to self 
in drug cases 
 
 Should not 
consider 
employment status 
 
Yes  No  
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Consider mitigating 
factors such as 
community ties 
Virginia Delegate 
& Public 
Defender 
Takes subjectivity out of 
decision making-process.  
 
Praxis can help ensure 
defendants are successful 
on pretrial release.  
 
Safer decisions made 
based on risk and not on 
how much money 
someone can pay  
Magistrate’s pretrial 
decisions must be 
overcome, excessive 
bond often initially 
imposed.  
 
Pretrial officers do 
not consistently 
follow Praxis 
recommendation.  
 
FTA is easier to 
predict than whether 
someone will break 
the law  
 
 
Increase 
likelihood of 
pretrial 
detention for 
minorities due to 
over policing.  
 
Count FTAs only if 
they are actual 
convictions 
 
Mitigating factors to 
consider: mental 
illness, time in 
community, 
children in school 
 
Praxis could include 
text messaging as a 
pretrial services 
method  
Yes  Yes  
Pretrial Officer 1 helped move risk 
assessments from 
subjective to objective 
 
Furthers goal to eliminate 
cash bond  
 
Improves public safety and 
appearance rates 
Crime Commission 
just catching up on 
VPRAI 
 
We have to 
remember detention 
should be a last 
resort  
None Keep studying and 
tweaking as needed 
Yes  No  
Pretrial Officer 2 Allows pretrial services to 
objectively calculate risk 
and recommend bond 
 
It’s evidence-based and 
validated 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Hard to factor in 
mental health issues  
Release of low-
risk defendants 
lowers their risk 
of recidivism, 
and makes them 
less likely to 
plead  
 
Consider weighing 
drug use differently 
depending on type 
of drug  
 
Improve 
constituency 
awareness of VPRAI  
 
Keep studying and 
improving as 
needed  
Yes  No  
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Chart for Initial Calculation 
Table 3 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Virginia Department of Criminal Justice Services. 2018. VPRAI Manual.  
                       
 
Chart for Secondary Calculation 
Table 4 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Virginia Department of Criminal Justice Services. 2018. VPRAI Manual. 
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Praxis Chart to Calculate Detention Recommendation and Steps for Risk 
Mitigation 
Table 5 
Source: Virginia Department of Criminal Justice Services. 2018. VPRAI Manual. 
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Analysis of Answers from Former Defendants  
Table 6    
Former 
Defendant(FD) 
Identified by 
Number and 
Most Serious 
Charge   
Risk  
Score* 
Was 
Released 
Before 
Trial  
VPRAI 
Recommend
ation 
Followed? 
Recalls 
Answering 
Pretrial 
Questions 
Cash Bail 
a 
Condition 
of Release 
Pretrial 
Services a 
Condition of 
Release 
Number 
of Days 
Detained 
Before 
Trial 
Praxis 
Recommen
dation 
Followed?*  
Hardships 
Related to 
Pretrial 
Detention 
FD1 
Felony Theft  
9 Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 1 Yes  Job Loss, Financial 
Problems, Housing 
Loss, Inability to 
care for child  
FD2 
Violent 
Misdemeanor  
0  Yes  Yes  No  Yes  No  1 Yes  Financial hardship 
FD3 
Non-Violent 
Misdemeanor 
0 Yes  Yes  No  Yes  No  1 Yes  Inability to provide 
for child, Financial 
hardship 
FD4 
Felony Theft  
9 Yes  Yes  No  Yes  Yes  3 Yes  Job loss, Financial 
hardship  
FD5 
1st time 
Misdemeanor DUI 
>0.15%  
0 No  No- law 
required 
mandatory time  
No  N/A  N/A 2 No  Financial hardship   
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Appendix 
List of Interviewees from the Professional Stakeholder Group  
1. Virginia Delegate and public defender, Jennifer Carroll Foy 
2. Stafford County Commonwealth Attorney, Eric Olsen  
3. Fredericksburg area defense attorney #1, confidentiality requested  
4. Fredericksburg area defense attorney #2, Stacey Garcia  
5. Rappahannock Regional Jail Pretrial Services officer #1, confidentiality requested 
6. Rappahannock Regional Jail Pretrial Services officer #2, confidentiality requested 
7. Stafford County judge, J. Bruce Strickland  
8. Virginia Department of Criminal Justice Services official, confidentiality requested 
 
Professional stakeholders who declined to be interviewed:  
1. Virginia State Crime Commission Executive Director, Kristen J. Howard  
2. Old Dominion University professor and co-author of Luminosity’s VPRAI validation study,      
Monna Danner  
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Appendix 
Interview Questions for Professional Stakeholder Group 
Question 1: How do pretrial risk assessments, or pretrial risk assessment tools, impact your 
work?  
Question 2: Do you believe the use of the Virginia Pretrial Risk Assessment Instrument 
(VPRAI), and related Praxis risk recommendation instrument improves justice in Virginia? Why 
or why not?  
Question 3:  Do you have any concerns about the implementation, use, or outcomes produced by 
VPRAI or Praxis?  
Question 4: To your knowledge, have other professionals brought up concerns about VPRAI, 
Praxis or similar risk calculation and mitigation instruments? What are those concerns?  
Questions 5: Do you believe that the 8 pretrial risk factors collected for VPRAI are good 
measures of risk? Why or why not?                  
                                  For reference, the 8 factors are, at the time of arrest, the individual:  
 1. Is on active community criminal justice supervision 
2.  Currently being charged for felony drug, theft, or fraud 
3.  Has a pending charge  
4.  Has one or more adult criminal convictions 
5. Has two or more failures to appear 
6. Has two or more violent convictions 
7. Is unemployed 
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8. Has a history of drug abuse 
 
Question 6:  In your opinion, what other factors should be used to determine whether a pretrial 
defendant would show up for court and remain on good behavior?  
Question 7: Are you aware of any concerns that the VPRAI or Praxis may be unintentionally 
biased against groups of people or in some other way flawed?  
Question 8: Has the use of VPRAI and Praxis made Virginia safer?  
Question 9: Do you believe that the use and implementation of VPRAI and Praxis must be 
studied further? Why? What could we learn? What should we learn?  
Question 10: Thinking about pretrial risk assessment tools in general, are there any additional 
comments you would like to make?   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
58 
 
Appendix 
Interview Questions for Former Defendant Group  
To begin, think about a time in your past in which you were arrested and waited in jail for a court 
appearance. Answer the following questions based off of that resolved incident.  
In what year did the arrest take place? _________ 
Mark all the charges that applied to your arrest:  
(Answers can be marked by either highlighting text, placing an “X” near the term, or writing a 
comment.)   
 Violent Felony 
 Violent Firearm  
 Violent Misdemeanor 
 Non-Violent Felony 
 Driving Under the Influence 
 Non-Violent Misdemeanor 
 Failure to Appear  
 Unsure 
If Failure to Appear was a charge, please select the charge you were supposed to appear for:  
o Violent Felony 
o Violent Firearm  
o Violent Misdemeanor 
o Non-Violent Felony 
o Driving Under the Influence 
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o Non-Violent Misdemeanor 
o Unsure  
 Now, please answer the questions in the box below based on how you would have likely answered 
these same questions at the time of your arrest.  (Answers can be marked by either highlighting text, 
placing an “X” near the term, or writing a comment.)   
 
In the following sections, answers can be marked by either highlighting text, placing an “X” near the 
term, or writing a comment. 
Question 1  At the time of arrest, 
were you on active 
criminal justice 
supervision?  
    
     Yes  
 
  No  
 
I would not have 
known how to 
answer.  
Other response or comment:  
 
  
Question 2  Was your arrest for 
felony drug, felony 
theft, or felony fraud?  
   
    Yes  
 
No  
I would not have 
known how to 
answer. 
Other response or comment:   
Question 3  At the time of arrest, 
did you have any 
pending charges? 
 
   Yes 
No I would not have 
known how to 
answer. 
Other response or comment:   
Question 4  At the time of arrest, 
did you have one or 
more adult criminal 
convictions?  
  Yes No I would not have 
known how to 
answer. 
Other response or comment:   
Question 5 At the time of arrest, 
did you have two or 
more failures to 
appear? 
 Yes No I would not have 
known how to 
answer. 
Other response or comment:   
Question 6  At the time of arrest, 
did you have two or 
more violent 
convictions?  
 Yes No I would not have 
known how to 
answer. 
Other response or comment:   
Question 7  At the time of arrest, 
were you unemployed?  
Yes No I would not have 
known how to 
answer. 
Other response or comment:   
Question 8  At the time of arrest, 
did you have a history 
of drug abuse?  
Yes No  I would not have 
known how to 
answer. 
Other response or comment:   
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Question 9: When you were detained in jail, do you remember someone asking you similar questions to 
those listed above?    
                                  
Question 10: Did a judge grant you pretrial release? (Pretrial release means you were allowed to leave 
jail before your trial.)  
      Yes       No    Unsure 
 
Question 11: Did you leave jail before your trial?  
         Yes, shortly after my      
release was allowed.  
Yes, eventually, but only after a 
delay of more than two days.  
No, I did not leave jail before 
my trial.  
 
Question 12: If you were given pretrial release, (allowed to leave jail before your trial), were there any 
terms associated?  
No terms to 
comply with  
    Cash Bond  
 
Released on 
own 
recognizance 
(signature) 
Check in with 
Pretrial 
Services  
Drug Test Other:  
 
Question 13: If you were given pretrial release, were you able to meet the terms of your release?  
              Yes                                No   Does Not Apply Other:  
 
 
Question 13:  Did being detained in jail before your trial cause you, or anyone you consider as close 
family, to suffer any hardship? Mark all that apply, and elaborate if you desire. Please do not include 
          Yes          No     Do not recall  
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hardships that came about while serving a sentence. Answers can be marked by either highlighting text, 
placing an “X” near the term, or writing a comment.   
Hardships that affected you due to incarceration before 
trial:  
Hardships that affected someone you would 
consider as close family, due to your 
incarceration before trial:  
 
Financial problems  
Job loss  
Vehicle repossession 
Housing loss 
Physical health decline  
Mental health decline  
Inability to provide care for a child  
Inability to provide care for an adult  
School absences 
Lost custody of child 
 
Other, please feel free to elaborate:   
 
 
 
 
 
Financial problems  
Job loss  
Vehicle repossession 
Housing loss 
Physical health decline  
Mental health decline  
Inability to provide care for a child  
Inability to provide care for an adult  
School absences 
Lost custody of child 
 
Other, please feel free to elaborate:   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
